I wrote yesterday about the death of two coal miners, James D. Thomas, 48, of North Tazewell, Va., and utilityman Pete Poindexter, 33, of Rock. in a roof collapse at the at Brooks Run Mining Co.’s Cucumber Mine in McDowell County, West Virginia.

The company, as you might imagine, is feeling bad:

In a prepared statement, Brooks Run said a “localized section of the mine roof unexpectedly collapsed and fell on the miners.”

“We’re extremely saddened by this tragic accident,” said Randy McMillion, Brooks Run’s president. “Right now our full attention is directed toward attending to the miners’ families and their coworkers, as well as providing our full cooperation to the ongoing investigation.”(emphasis added)

These "unexpected" tragedies are just so...unexpected. After all these centuries, gravity never ceases to surprise.

It turns out, of course, that while Brooks Run hadn't "expected" the roof to crush Thomas and Poindexter that day, like most workplace hazards, the hazards of "retreat mining" were anything but unknown or unexpected.

In a November 2001 report, then-Gov. Bob Wise was encouraged to closely examine — and possibly ban or much more tightly restrict — “retreat mining.”

During this especially dangerous procedure, miners remove the last bits of coal possible from pillars meant to hold up the mine roof, or remove entire pillars.

This is done as miners are moving out of a section, and mine roofs are expected to fall as miners pull the pillars.

Miners were pulling pillars Saturday morning at Brooks Run Mining Co.’s Cucumber Mine in McDowell County when a roof fall killed two employees.

So just how "unexpected" were these deaths?

Between 1978 and 1986, 67 roof-fall deaths — about one-third of the total — occurred during retreat mining, according to a government study.

Between 1989 and 1996, pulling pillars accounted for 10 percent of underground coal production, according to a report from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. At the same time, the practice accounted for 25 percent of underground coal mining deaths, the NIOSH report said.

Between 1996 and 2005, at least 13 of the 63 roof fall deaths nationwide occurred during retreat mining, according to a Gazette analysis of MSHA records. Seven of those 13 deaths occurred in West Virginia, the analysis showed.

The 2001 report was written by former Clinton Administration MSHA director Davit McAteer. (McAteer also headed up current West Virginia governor Manchin's investigations of last year's Sago and Alma mine disasters.) McAteer

cautioned that pillaring is “an especially dangerous extraction practice which should be critically reviewed and/or significantly revised, with adequate requirements and criteria drawn up to provide protection to the miners engaged in such techniques.

“New standards of safety and health precautions need to be developed, including engineering criteria for mining in previously disturbed coal beds and seams, and these new standards must be applied before such methods are approved by state or federal regulations,” wrote McAteer, who headed the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration during President Clinton’s administration.

McAteer went on to recommend that retreat mining be “very carefully reviewed and critically examined” to determine whether its approval should be continued.

Wise acted on some of McAteer’s recommendations, such as more closely scrutinizing coal contractors and increasing fines for safety violations. But Wise took no action on retreat mining.

Gov. Joe Manchin has also not addressed the issue in his mine-safety reform efforts, either in a bill passed in one day last year or in his latest legislation proposed last week.

More on mine safety problems here.

Labels: Coal Mining

Two miners were killed in a roof collapse in a West Virginia mine yesterday. The deaths occurred at the Brooks Run Mining Co.’s Cucumber Mine, in the town of Cucumber, about 25 miles south of Welch near the Virginia border

both said the miners were apparently performing “retreat mining,” a dangerous process where miners remove the last bits of coal possible from pillars meant to hold up the mine roof before abandoning that section of the mine.

These were the first two coal mining deaths in West Virginia this year. Another coal miner, Jeremy Garcia, 26, was killed in a Colorado coal mine last week.

The mine didn't exactly have a steller safety record, according to Ken Ward at the Charleston Gazette.

Last year, the Cucumber Mine recorded an injury rate that was twice the national average for similar mines, according to MSHA data.

Mine officials reported seven nonfatal injuries in 2006, including one machinery accident that left a worker with permanent total or permanent partial disabilities, according to MSHA records.

In 2006, MSHA inspectors cited the mine for 65 violations, assessing it $5,051 in fines, and the company paid the total amount, the records show.

During the last two quarterly inspections in 2006, MSHA inspectors found 32 violations, including six related to roof-control problems, according to federal data.

***

In late October, a 49-year-old continuous-mining-machine operator, Thomas Channell, was killed in another Alpha subsidiary’s mine in Preston County.

Channell died when a mine wall fell, pinning him against a shuttle car. Federal officials issued no citations in that death at Kingwood Mining Co.’s Whitetail Kittanning Mine near Fellowsville.

Last month, MSHA chief Richard Stickler visited a Brooks Run coal preparation plant in Webster County to celebrate the operation’s receiving a prestigious Sentinels of Safety Award in 2005 for having no reportable accidents during its employees’ 122,000 hours worked that year.

But in 2004, two Brooks Run miners were killed in a five-week period, one at the preparation plant Stickler visited and another at a nearby underground mine. MSHA cited the company in both deaths, and Brooks Run paid a total of $66,000 in fines.

After his visit, Stickler said in an interview, “They had those two fatalities and they made a commitment that they were going to do something drastically different. Obviously, this company has made a commitment to safety. That’s the way they’re running their business.”

Or not.

47 coal miners were killed on the job last year, according to MSHA, the most since 1995. 22 coal miners were killed in 2005. 25 metal/non-metal miners were killed on the job last year, compared with 35 the year before. One metal/non-metal miner has been killed on the job so far this year.

Labels: Coal Mining, Richard Stickler, West Virginia

Boy those mine companies are really busting their balls to provide rspirators for miners. They can't help it if there aren't enough respirators to go around. But Charleston Gazette reporter Ken Ward writes that something's rotten in the state of West Virginia.

A year after the Sago Mine disaster, thousands of West Virginia coal miners are still waiting for the additional emergency breathing devices promised by Gov. Joe Manchin and the coal industry.

Many of the state’s mine operators have placed orders with the nation’s largest manufacturer, CSE Corp., and could be waiting until late 2007 for delivery. CSE’s biggest competitor, Ocenco Inc., has an even longer waiting list.

“My sense is that there is a tremendous backorder,” said Chris Hamilton, a vice president for the West Virginia Coal Association.

Turns out Hamilton's "sense" is "nonsense."

At the same time, another supplier, the German company Draeger, has thousands of self-contained self-rescuers, or SCSRs, sitting in a warehouse.

“We don’t have a backlog at all,” Wes Kenneweg, president of Draeger’s North American operations, said in an interview earlier this month.

At Draeger’s warehouse near the Pittsburgh airport, more than 6,500 of its OXY K-Plus units fill row after row of shelves.

“We haven’t had that many orders,” Kenneweg said.

Uh, maybe they could try leafing through the phone book.

And what's wrong with this picture? It seems that although the West Virginia and federal mine safety laws require mining companies to provide more rescue respirators throughout the mines, and provide a plan by last August for how many respirators must be provided and where they'll be located, Ward reports that

neither state nor federal officials have actually required companies to buy the devices and give them to miners.

Of course, not everyone is happy to wait:

Phil Smith, a spokesman for the United Mine Workers, said that the union is concerned about delays in getting SCSRs into the nation’s coal mines.

“They need to have these units, and it’s obviously better to have them sooner rather than later,” Smith said.

***

In his report on the Sago disaster, former MSHA chief Davitt McAteer urged the mining industry not to delay safety improvements waiting for complete answers or perfect technology.

“The unmistakable message of the Sago Mine disaster is that we cannot afford to wait,” McAteer wrote.

And it's not hard to understand why no more time should be lost. The need for improved respirators is nothing new. The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 required rescue respirators that would provide at least one hour of air, but the regulations that actually implemented the requirement were not finished until 1981. It became clear very soon that one hour of air was not enough, and the Clinton administration began the process of developing regulations to requre more respirators and better technologies. But -- and how many times have we heard this before? --

the effort wasn’t completed, and the Bush administration scuttled the proposal after taking office in 2001.

Reform of SCSR rules gained political traction again only after 12 miners died in the Jan. 2 Sago disaster, two more in the Aracoma fire and five in the Darby disaster.

Now, we have laws reqiring more and better respirators, but the companies seem to be shopping only at the establishments that have backlogs. And you don't want to interfere with their freedom to shop where they want:

Terry Farley, administrator for West Virginia’s mine safety office, said that his agency continues to accept purchase orders to show compliance. Soon, he said, inspectors may start asking to see letters from SCSR supplies showing estimated delivery dates.

“Our folks have been told to check and make sure nobody is stalling,” Farley said.

Still, there’s little the state can do to force companies to switch to another company that has units available, Farley said.

“At this point, we cannot tell people what brand to buy,” Farley said.

Bruce Watzman, a lobbyist on safety issues for the National Mining Association, was surprised to hear that Draeger had so many units on hand.

“I thought the available units were being purchased and utilized,” Watzman said. “But that boils down to individual company decisions about what unit is the best for the needs of their employees.”

I'm sure miners don't mind waiting....at least until the next fire.

Labels: Coal Mining, Mine Safety, MSHA, Sago

This is the fourth “Top Ten” list I’ve compiled. It’s always an educational experience for me because I get to look back at everything that’s happened over the past year. But something struck me this year: for thousands of people there was really only one top story of the year – the senseless loss of a husband or wife, daughter, son, father or mother, brother or sister, friend or co-worker. (See number 6 below). The rest is just commentary.

Nevertheless, as we here at Confined Space never tire of saying, workplace tragedies occur not as isolated, random incidents, but in a political and historical context. And if we’re going to change things, we need to understand those relationships.

So here goes…

1. Sago: What else? The Sago mine disaster of January 2, 2006, catapulted mine safety into the nation’s consciousness like no other workplace disaster in decades. Subsequent mine explosions and fires in the Aracoma and Darby mines, as well as numerous other coal mine accidents, largely stemming from increased mine activity (as a result of higher energy prices), neglected maintenance, crumbling infrastruture and insufficient training led to 47 coal mining deaths in 2006, a ten year high and more than twice as many as in 2005. Faulty respirators, poor communication between miners and the surface contributed to the tragedies.

   But more important, the coal mine disasters of ’06 revealed the Bush administration’s abdication of its responsibility to ensure safe workplaces for this nation’s miners. Investigations by aggressive reporters like the Charleston Gazette’s Ken Ward showed how the Bush administration filled MSHA with industry insiders, deep-sixed numerous regulations that would have prevented or reduced the consequences of the mine accidents, cut the number of mine inspectors, failed to cite safety violations and failed to collect fines from those mining companies that were cited. The mining tragedies of 2006 revealed to Americans the human toll of this administration’s close ties to the industries it is supposed to regulate. No longer able to deny that the Emperor was as naked as a jaybird, Congress overwhelmingly passed the MINER Act which started the process of implementing needed improvements in the nation’s mine safety law. New mine safety laws were also passed in West Virginia and Kentucky.
   
   

2. Richard Stickler: The Bush administration added insult to injury (and death) by nominating of Richard Stickler to head the Mine Safety and Health Administration. Stickler, nominated a few months pre-Sago, was perfect for that long-gone (and never really existing) era when MSHA was a forgotten dusty agency that no one noticed or cared about. But after the tragic first few months of ’06 and Stickler’s less-than-impressive performance at his confirmation hearing, it became vividly clear to almost everyone outside the reality-resistant walls of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue that the former mine industry manager with a lousy safety record was manifestly unsuited for the job. Even the Republican controlled Senate couldn't stomach Sticker, forcing Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist to halt the vote on his confirmation. Then the Senate, in an unprecedented move, voted to return the nomination to the White House – a subtle hint that the President might want to consider a more qualified candidate.
   
   Bush didn't take the hint. In response, he launched the tennis game from hell, serving Stickler’s nomination back to the Senate, which duly returned it back to the White House for a second time. Bush then defiantly gave Stickler the job with a one-year recess appointment, and then for the third time lobbed his name back to the Senate for permanent confirmation where it rotted as time ran out on the 109th Congress and the Republican majority. Given the makeup of the new Senate, unless Stickler pulls some rabbit out of his hat, he’ll be heading back to retirement in West Virginia at the end of 2007.
   
   
3. Ed Foulke’s Unimpressive Debut At OSHA: Coming from a union-busting law firm, Ed Foulke had a lot to prove when he took the reins of OSHA last March. Would he be able to overcome OSHA's hard-earned image as a tired, ineffective, moribund, anti-worker agency that had become almost totally irrelevant to workplace safety in this country?
   
   Apparently not. Foulke blew his honeymoon almost immediately with a series of speeches that seemed to blame workplace injuries and deaths on dumb workers who "do the darnedest things." Blaming employees for on-the-job injuries and fatalities is an all-too-common myth for those who don't understand that unsafe working conditions actually cause workplace deaths and injuries, but such ignorant rhetoric was more than a little surprising and unforgivable coming from the man who is supposed to be leading the nation's effort to make workplaces safe. In fact, Foulke’s follies were so notable that they even made the “Regulators” column in the Washington Post.
   
   
4. OSHA’s Miserable Failure to Issue Standards: One of the jobs that Congress gave OSHA when it was created in 1970 was to issue standards that would protect workers from work-related injuries, illnesses and deaths. George Bush's OSHA seemed to have completely forgotten this role until, after years of regulatory infertility, the agency finally gave birth to its first major health standard in six years. But OSHA's new hexavalent chromium standard was not exactly the product of a loving and caring relationship between government and workers. In fact, it was conceived under duress by a union petition and lawsuit, and delivered by Caesarian section under a court order.
   
   The result, as might be expected, was a pretty darn ugly baby. The hexavalent chromium standard established a permissible exposure limit so high that it will allow hundreds of extra lung cancer deaths among exposed workers, and OSHA wrote the standard in such an obtuse and confusing way that it will be difficult for employers or workers to figure out exactly what must be done. Hardly a sterling effort for an administration that likes to complain about how difficult it is to understand government regulations. The new standard was issued less than a week after a report revealed that scientists working for the chromium industry had concealed data from OSHA that showed that even very low level exposures to hexavalent chromium can cause cancer.
   
   Meanwhile, unions have petitioned OSHA for two emergency temporary standards, one to protect workers against pandemic flu, and the other to protect workers against the lung-destroying effects of diacetyl, the ingredient used to provide butter flavoring for popcorn and other foods. OSHA has responded to neither petition. Oh, and then there’s the little matter of the proposed standard that would require employees to pay for workers' boots, gloves and other personal protective equipment required by OSHA standards. It was all ready to be issued at the end of the Clinton administration, but the deciders of the current regime have still not decided how to proceed. (Flash! Update here.)
   
   
5. BP Texas City Explosion Aftermath: The massive explosion at BP’s Texas City refinery that killed 15 workers and injured 180 in March of 2005 barely caused a ripple in the nation's consciousness compared to the 2006 Sago tragedy despite the record $21.3 million OSHA penalty. Yet revelations throughout 2006 about BP's faulty safety system have raised major questions not just about the giant oil company itself and how seriously it takes the safety of its workers, but also OSHA’s failure to enforce refinery safety regulations.
   
   Preliminary reports of the Chemical Safety Board (whose final report will be issued in early 2007), as well as documents released as a result of the settlement with BP of a lawsuit filed by Eva Rowe, who lost both of her parents in the explosion, revealed a devastating picture of a company that cut back on its safety budget, delayed maintenance, failed to conduct training and ignored warnings by refinery management that all was not well at the plant. The BP story has been highlighted in CBS's 60 Minutes as well as numerous media reports about other problems plaguing BP. All of this was topped off by a massive pipeline leak in Alaska, more OSHA citations at other facilities, and civil and criminal investigations into illegal energy market manipulation. None of this stopped BP's CEO Lord John Browne from pulling down a cool $11 million in compensation last year.
   
   
6. Families Go On The Offensive: From West Virginia and Kentucky to Texas, California and Maine, families of workers killed on the job are getting mad as hell and refusing to take it anymore. Frustrated by the small fines and weak penalties resulting from the preventable deaths of their loved ones, mine widows demanded better information about what happened to their husbands, picketed mines to keep their health care, and spoke truth to power by warning President Bush not to appoint Richard Stickler to head MSHA. Family members like Coit Smith, whose son was killed in a meat processing plant, Michelle Lewis, whose stepfather was killed in a trench collapse, and Tammy Miser, whose brother was killed in a factory explosion, and many others have launched campaigns to change the way workplace safety oversight works in this country, writing newspaper columns, putting up billboards, creating web pages, lobbying legislators and providing support to the families who have suffered similar losses.
   
   
7. Union organizing victories: The organizing victories of janitors in Houston and the University of Miami, the successful campaign to organize the nation’s hotel workers and surging support for the Employee Free Choice Act that would require unions to be recognized by card check, rather than the failed traditional system of workplace elections, are not – on the surface – health and safety stories. But while a strong and active OSHA is necessary, anyone who’s worked a hazardous job will tell you that the best tool to make the workplace safe isn’t an OSHA inspection; it’s a well organized and knowledgeable union. In addition, health and safety issues can be a major reason that workers decide to organize as we’ve been seeing in the University of Miami campaign and UNITE-HERE's campaign to organize and win better contracts for the nation’s workers.
   
   
8. Undercounting Injuries And Illnesses: OSHA broke open the champagne to celebrate a record low number of reported workplace injuries and illnesses last year, but the only thing bubbling to the surface is growing certainty that despite the hundreds of millions of dollars spent by OSHA and the Bureau of Labor Statistics on collecting workplace injury and illness data, no one really knows how many workers are injured and made sick on the job every year. One recent study estimated that the current national surveillance system for work-related injuries and illnesses may miss two-thirds of the total number of occupational injuries and illnesses. The reasons for undercounting are no mystery. Articles by ghost writer ERM Jr showed how and why companies cheat on their injury and illness reporting, and why OSHA prefers it that way. Meanwhile, a Confined Space series on KFM, the chief contractor on the San Francisco Bay Bridge project, revealed how companies are able to cook the books by discouraging workers to report injuries and illnesses.
   
   
9. Chemical Safety Board Takes Up The Slack: With OSHA and MSHA struggling unsuccessfully to pass the oversight laugh-test, the tiny Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board seems to be the only serious workplace safety game in Washington at the moment. Among the six reports that the Bush-appointed Board has issued this year was a study on combustible dust explosions that recommended that OSHA issue a standard to prevent the often overlooked hazard that killed 14 workers in 2004, and killed 119 workers and injured 718 over the past 25 years. The CSB also issued a timely report on an incident at a chemical manufacturing plant in Georgia that had major problems in the way the city and county handled the emergency response, and how the state oversees emergency response efforts of the cities and counties. More significantly, the Board revealed disturbing preliminary findings of its BP investigation including an appearance by its Chairman Carolyn Merritt on 60 Minutes. (See number 3 above) And in December, the Board held a hearing in Daytona Beach, Florida concerning an explosion in the city’s wastewater treatment plant that killed two public employees – public employees who are not covered by OSHA in Florida (and in 25 other states), have no right to a safe workplace, and can die like dogs -- which seems to bother no one, except possibly the Chemical Safety Board.
   
   
10. Confined Space Wins Koufax Award For Best Single Issue Blog: Yes, after a hard-fought contest, Confined Space won a convincing victory for the best single issued "lefty" blog, an award even more significant than being named Time’s Person of The Year. And Confined Space came in third in the running for LaborStart's Best Labor Website Of The Year.
    
    Bottom Line: You like me, you really like me!
    
    Real bottom line: There are a lot of angry people out there and Confined Space has helped them find a voice.
    

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Labels: Chemical Safety Board, Coal Mining, Richard Stickler, Sago, Top Ten Workplace Safety Stories

Today marks the first anniversary of the Sago Mine Disaster which killed twelve West Virginia miners and launched a year that would see the number of deaths in the nation's coal mines climb from 22 in 2005 to 47 in 2006. Sago and subsequent incidents led to the passage of mine safety legislation in the US Congress and the states of West Virginia and Kentucky.

But conditions aren't improving fast enough:

Many of the safety measures that state legislatures and the Congress rushed to adopt to protect the 46,000 people working in the nation's underground coal mines after the Sago Mine explosion a year ago today have yet to take effect.

There are still no rescue chambers or wireless tracking and communications equipment in the country's 606 underground coal mines, and it is unlikely that there will be until federal requirements kick in more than two years from now.

Hundreds of emergency air packs that are to be stored underground - currently required by law - are on back order and will take months to deliver.

"You can't walk over and flip the switch and change it all in a year," said James M. Dean, who spent eight months as West Virginia's mine safety chief after the Sago Mine explosion. "The negative is, it's not happening fast enough."

And just today, Ken Ward at the Charleston Gazette notes that MSHA knew for ten years that the foam blocks allowed by the Mine Safety and Health Administration to to seal off abandoned areas of mines were not strong enough to withstand the blast forces that could be anticipated.

One year ago today, an explosion tore through International Coal Group’s Sago Mine in Upshur County. Twelve miners died.

So far, two state investigations have blamed lightning. Neither probe has figured out how lightning got into the mine. But both have found that the explosion was far stronger than the 20-psi standard mine seals were required to meet.

Five months after Sago, then-acting MSHA chief David Dye issued a temporary moratorium on new seals built under the agency’s 20-psi standard. State officials in West Virginia took similar action.

But the Sago disaster might not have happened if regulators and the coal industry had heeded the warnings from Oak Grove, and from a series of other lightning-induced explosions in the U.S. and abroad dating back more than 30 years, federal and state investigators have learned.

Today, thousands of underground miners across the coalfields work alongside foam-block seals that experts now acknowledge don’t meet the “explosion proof” test required by the 1969 federal mine safety law.

So far, no one has a plan to protect these miners.

More information on the 2006 mine disasters here.

Labels: Coal Mining, Today In Workplace Safety History

As funeral preparations get under way for the 47th coal miner of 2006 to die in the workplace, the Charleston Gazette once again takes down the Bush administration's sellout of American miners:

For example, at surface mines, monster trucks used to haul coal and rock are involved in numerous fatalities, often because their brakes are faulty and are not adequately inspected. In other cases, drivers cannot see other workers in the vehicles’ blind spots. Some safety equipment would help prevent these deaths. Video scanners can be mounted to the trucks and rigged to come on automatically when a driver shifts into reverse, giving the driver a view of what’s behind. But both federal and state agencies have dawdled about requiring this lifesaving precaution.

During the Clinton administration, Davitt McAteer, then head of the U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration, asked mine operators to install such video cameras voluntarily. He sought industry opinions on a rule that would require them. But after President Bush took office, MSHA suddenly had other priorities, and the idea was dropped.

But the Gazette's editors are somewhat impressed with the words of controversial MSHA head Richard Stickler. Now if he can only put his money where his mouth is:

President Bush’s most recent appointment to head MSHA, West Virginia native Richard Stickler, has a chance to set these conditions right. So far, he’s saying all the right things. He speaks plainly and sensibly about safety and the need for change. He promises a crackdown on operators who chronically break safety rules. Where the state’s report on the Sago disaster is contradictory and leaves many questions unanswered, Stickler promises a complete report, however long it takes.

“My approach is to be very aggressive,” Stickler said during a visit to the Gazette, “particularly on the attitude that fines are just the cost of doing business.”

Safety starts at the top, Stickler said. Individual miners must have confidence that their employers support following safety rules and reporting problems so they can be corrected.

Less than a month on the job, Stickler sounds good. If he can deliver the action he has promised, miners and their employers will be better off, and President Bush will have made a good appointment and given the nation a good public servant.

Time will tell. Personally, I'd rather be proven wrong by a bad nominee proving himself to be surprisingly good than the other way around.

Labels: Coal Mining, Richard Stickler, Sago

Anyone want to take bets on how long Ron Wooten, director of the state Office of Miners Health, Safety and Training, will last in his job after his pitiful performance the other day when he "dumped" the state's report on the Sago mine disaster on the laps of the families of the miners killed?

Frustrated by a cursory briefing and a confusing report, families of the miners killed in the Sago Mine disaster are focusing their anger on Gov. Joe Manchin and his pick to run the state mine safety office, longtime CONSOL Energy official Ron Wooten.

“Our governor has to be totally embarrassed for appointing him to this position,” said Pam Campbell, the sister-in-law of Sago miner Marty Bennett.

Wooten, director of the state Office of Miners Health, Safety and Training, has not returned repeated phone calls. A spokeswoman said he would not discuss the matter publicly until after he meets again with Sago families.

- advertisement -
Lara Ramsburg, Manchin’s communications director, said the governor was “disappointed” with the handling of Monday’s meeting. Ramsburg added, “the governor has confidence in all of our appointees, including Mr. Wooten.”

Several versions of the state’s Sago report have been circulated since Monday, when Manchin and state investigators were set to release it to Sago families and the public.
Families became upset when Wooten simply handed them copies of the report and referred them to it for answers to their questions.

During the private meeting, Manchin stepped in and told Wooten he had expected a more detailed briefing, similar to one given a month earlier to the widows of two miners killed in the Aracoma Mine fire. Administration officials promised the families a better briefing, and then canceled an afternoon news conference, but not before copies of the report leaked out and were splashed all over the news.

Campbell said that Monday’s meeting “was a disaster.”

And although the reports seems to have concluded that the explosion was ignited by lightning, it had trouble explaining how the electrical charge traveled over a mile into the mine.

Labels: Coal Mining, Sago

I have been lucky enough never to have a tragedy in my immediate family. I've never lost a loved one in an accident.

But one thing I've learned after working many years in workplace safety is that families need some kind of closure when their loved is killed in a workplace accident, and they rarely get it, particularly from OSHA or other agencies that are tasked with investigating the incident and issuing citations. All too often I hear stories from parents or spouses that they never really got the whole story on what exactly happened to their husband or daughter, and what the real causes were. Too often they're just given a list of OSHA violations, a short summary of the cause of death, and whispered allegations that the victims themselves were at fault for being careless or negligent.

So it was completely understandable how upset the families of the miners killed in the Sago disaster last year were following the release of the state of West Virginia's report on the tragedy by Ronald Wooten, director of the state Office of Miners’ Health, Safety and Training.

On Monday, Wooten came under heavy criticism from families of the Sago victims after a private meeting that was billed as a briefing for families on the state’s new report on the disaster.

Families were upset when Wooten simply provided them with copies of the thick report, told them lightning caused the disaster, and asked for questions.

When families asked questions, they were told the answers were in the report and that they should read it.

Families had expected a more detailed — and understandable — briefing, similar to one that was provided a month ago to families of the two miners killed in the Aracoma Mine fire.

Also, families became angrier when they learned that Wooten’s agency had posted the report — or at least one version of it — on its Web site hours before the family meeting. Families had thought they would learn the report’s contents first, but by the time their meeting ended, the report was all over the news.

The report was then withdrawn, initially because it was to be re-written, but later Wooten said that they were only preparing a better briefing for the families.

Wooten came under significant criticism when he was appointed due to his controversial career in the coal industry as former vice president of safety for CONSOL Energy Inc. from 1983 until 1998, a lawyer and lobbyist for CONSOL before that, and a lawyer for the American Mining Congress, an industry group.

A couple of other things. Even if lightning was involved, it was only one cause of the disaster. To be more precise, it may have been the ignition source of the explosion. But the explosion itself only killed one of the miners, and then only because the seals behind the closed off part of the mine didn't hold. The others died from asphyxiation for a number of reasons: the respirators either malfunctioned or the miners were not trained to use them properly (or both), it took too long for the rescue team to enter the mine, rescuers had no way to locate the miners, and the miners had no way to communicate with the surface.

In other words, simply telling the families that "lightning caused the disaster" period, end and go read the report yourselves was at best insensitive, and at worst ignorent, incompetent and not a statement that someone heading up the state's mine safety office should ever have made.

To make matters worse, the Associated Press reported that Wooten

told relatives of the Sago Mine disaster victims that he "wouldn't want to be in there" if another electrical storm rolled over an active underground coal mine with a worked-out, recently sealed area, the brother of one victim said today.

Yet the state has taken no action to change its rules and regulations.

John Groves, whose brother Jerry was among 12 men who died in or after the Jan. 2 blast, said the comment came in a private meeting earlier this week as he and others questioned Ron Wooten, director of the state Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training.

The families asked Wooten a series of questions about how the state would respond now that its investigation report has blamed lightning for causing the Sago explosion. They then pressed the point on active mines with newly sealed areas, asking what he would do.

"I wouldn't want to be in there," Wooten allegedly replied.

Several other people who were in the room at the time told The Associated Press the same account of that conversation.

Wooten's comment prompted a response from the United Mineworkers:

"I think there are 14,000 coal miners in West Virginia that wouldn't want to be in there, either," said United Mine Workers spokesman Phil Smith, when told of Wooten's remark.

Since learning the state would join Sago Mine owner International Coal Group Inc. in blaming lightning, the UMW has called for new regulations that require miners to be evacuated when an electrical storm is approaching.

Wooten's simplistic explanation was even a bit too much for MSHA head Richard Stickler. MSHA is preparing its own report on the Sago disaster:

Stickler indicated a partial answer on the cause from his team would not be acceptable.

"If it was lightning, how did it get in the mine? If you don't know that, you don't know how to keep it out, do you?" he said. "There's questions there we need the answers to."

Stickler also seemed to learn a lesson from Wooten's presentation:

Stickler said he will be present when his agency's report is given to the Sago families, and that they will have the chance to question the investigators.

"We will give them copies of report, but not necessarily expect them to sit there and read the report and know what's in it," he said.

I'm sure the families would appreciate that.

Labels: Coal Mining, Richard Stickler, Sago

Louiville Courier Journal columnist David Hawpe has a good idea. Newly elected Congressman John Yarmuth (D-KY) is going to make a speech next week on "expectations for the Democratic majority in Congress" and Hawpe wants him to talk about workplace safety issues. It's an important issue with so many major assembly lines and distribution facilities in Louisville, and coal fields throughout Kentucky.

But beyond the obvious manufacturing and mining hazards, Hawpe would like to hear Yarmuth talk about the "unfinished business" of ergonomic hazards. You remember ergonomics, don't you? That was the standard that the Clinton Administration issued after 10 years of effort through Republican and Democratic administrations -- that was then repealed by the Republicans Congress and new President in 2001. Since then we've not only failed to see any new ergonomics standard, but Elaine Chao's Labor Department has been far more busy withdrawing regulations than issuing any -- except under court order.

After this year's spate of mine tragedies, it's a little easier to convince folks that working conditions in the coal industry must be improved.

But the mention of ergonomics still elicits a yawn or a giggle from all too many, including those who think such injuries occur in the kitchen or around the house, not on the job.

During 2004, the last year for which Bureau of Labor Statistics are available, there were 402,700 reported musculoskeletal disorder (MSD) cases that resulted in lost work days. And such cases constitute the biggest category of lost work days -- almost one-third of worker injuries and illnesses.

Not only that, but occupational illness and injury are, by almost everybody's account, grossly underestimated, maybe by as much as 69 percent.

The union safety advocates say, "A combination of too few OSHA inspectors and low penalties makes the threat of an OSHA inspection hollow for too many employers. More than 8.5 million workers still are without OSHA coverage."

And ergonomics reform remains unfinished business.

Hawpe has been a consistent champion of workers and workplace safety and health, calling coal "an outlaw industry" following the Sago mine tragedy. One thing that Hawpe doesn't mention in this column is that Yarmuth won his seat by defeating Congresswoman Anne Northup. Northup was on the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies, which determines OSHA's budget. She was a strong enemy of ergonomic standards earning great praise from business associations in 2000 for introducing legislation that "would prohibit OSHA funds from being used "to promulgate, issue, implement, administer or enforce any proposed, temporary or final standard on ergonomic protection."

And finally, Hawpe has excellent taste in blogs:

There's an excellent blog called Confined Space that collects information about, and comments on, such topics. It recently ran a piece entitled "What the next Congress has in store of workplace safety."

The final item said, "Business associations have been busy sending out alarms that the sky is falling, fearing that Democrats will try to push national ergonomics standards and force OSHA to scale back its voluntary programs."

So my question for John Yarmuth when he speaks to his fellow Ivy Leaguers is whether the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers and the National Federation of Independent Business have anything to worry about.

Finally, if you have a question you'd like him to ask Yarmuth, he asks you to e-mail him at dhawpe@courier-journal.com. But why stop there. This is a good idea for reporter to start asking all newly elected Congress types (as well as the old ones) before they start the new session of Congress. Send your questions to Hawpe, but put them in the comments below as well.

Go crazy.

Labels: Coal Mining, Sago

The state of Kentucky has issued a report on the May 20 explosion at the Kentucky Darby No. 1 coal mine in Harlan County, Ky., that killed five miners, Jimmy Lee, 33; Amon “Cotton” Brock, 51; Roy Middleton, 35; George William “Bill” Petra, 49; and Paris Thomas Jr., 53. A sixth miner, Paul Ledford, survived.

According to the report,

The underground blast was triggered by two miners using the torch to remove a metal roof strap intersecting an area of the Kentucky Darby No. 1 Mine that employees knew was leaking methane, the Office of Mine Safety and Licensing found.

The seal, intended to keep methane from leaking into the working part of the mine, was improperly constructed; use of the torch in that part of the mine was illegal; and the leaking methane should have been immediately corrected when it was first noted, according to the investigative report.

In addition, the report said, mine superintendent and co-owner Ralph Napier, along with two other company supervisors, admitted to investigators that they were not familiar with approved procedures for constructing the seals.

As a result of their supervisors’ ignorance, the employees who built the seals were not properly trained to do the job, the state concluded. Investigators were told, and physical evidence indicated, that the seals were built from blocks that were not bonded together with an adhesive agent and were not secured to the floor and walls.

Noting that in the last decade, Kentucky has lost more miners than any other staet, a Louisville Courier Journal Editorial describes the lessons of the Darby mine disaster:

The most obvious lessons are these: (1) It's really not "accidents" that kill miners. Rather, they die because laws are broken, regulations are ignored, rules are circumvented. (2) Federal and state regulators should be working in concert, to prevent deaths and injuries. Instead, they sometimes find themselves at cross purposes.

Had Darby been operated according to the rules, the five miners who died almost certainly would be getting ready for Christmas with their families. Improperly installed seals, built by employees whose supervisors didn't know how to do it, and therefore couldn't show their workers how, were part of the problem. So was the illegal use of a cutting torch to remove a metal roof strap. So was the lingering failure to correct a methane gas leak.

The Journal notes that there will be other reports about this and other mine disasters.

But one basic truth has been long apparent: There's nothing accidental about deaths in the mines, and, when it comes to avoiding them, nothing can be left to chance.

Meanwhile, the owners of Kentucky Darby have apparently abandoned the mine. Mine owners already owe $5,110 for 41 violations not related to the disaster, and could owe tens of thousands more in state and MSHA fines. But the fines may be hard to collect:

It could not be determined yesterday whether Kentucky Darby still is an active company.

The company's phone number was disconnected, and co-owner Ralph Napier did not return calls to other numbers.

The other owner of Kentucky Darby, John D. North, could not be located.

Kentucky Darby is listed as an active company with the Kentucky secretary of state's office, but the firm's most recent annual report was June 27.

Advocates say it is not uncommon for coal operators to run different mines under different company names and to close mines and companies and start new ones under new names in other locations.

MSHA and the state claim that the fines will be collected, although MSHA came under criticism after the Sago mine disaster when it was revealed that they had never collected a large percentage of the fines levied on safey violators.

Labels: Coal Mining

And while we're talking about Congressional oversight, a prime subject might be OSHA's weak efforts to ensure safety in our nation's petrochemical industry and how increased funding and inspection strategies might address the problem.

One finding of the US Chemical Safety Board's investigation into the March 2005 explosion at BP's Texas City refinery that killed 15 workers is the contribution of OSHA's lax enforcement.

The board’s chairwoman indicated that OSHA’s approach to workplace safety might be a bit shortsighted.

“It’s just like BP was focused on trips and falls and lost work-time incident rates,” said Carolyn Merritt, who chairs the Chemical Safety Board. “OSHA focused on that, and they’re not going to recognize, for instance, if (a company) cuts too far back in maintenance.”

Merritt said OSHA’s approach does not recognize the long-term potential for disaster due to poor maintenance or other lax process-safety measures.

TJ Aulds, writing in the Galveston Daily News notes that U.S. Secretary of Labor Elaine L. Chao recently released a report showing workplace injuries and illnesses to be at an all-time low, and credits "compliance assistance from the regulated companies, health and safety partnerships with labor groups and targeted, “aggressive” enforcement against bad actors" for the improvement. (More on that here.)

Although OSHA's inspections of petrochemical facilites has picked up recently, that increase is a result of the catastropic BP explosion and other small incidents. In fact, according to Aulds, it may be OSHA's reliance on self regulation that's causing the problems.

Department of Labor statistics obtained by The Daily News show that in OSHA’s Region 6, which includes Texas and four other states, the agency conducted 123 inspections of petrochemical facilities in three years, from Oct. 1, 2003, through Sept. 30, 2006.

The vast majority of those inspections would not be considered preventative. In fact, 91 were conducted as a result of an accident, referral or complaint.

The rest were either follow-ups to previous inspections or related to an accident, complaint or referral.

Forty-eight of all of the Region 6 inspections during that same three-year period were conducted by the Houston office, which has oversight of the petrochemical facilities in Galveston County.

From those inspections, OSHA issued only four non-injury or non-incident citations.

However, the rate of inspections has picked up dramatically in the Houston region since the blasts at BP.

The root cause of this problem is, of course, not lazy OSHA inspectors, according to Merritt:

“Listen, they are understaffed, under-funded and overworked,” she said. “It’s simply a big job, and OSHA doesn’t have the resources to do much more than it already is.”

And the cause of that problem lies in Washington D.C.

Nevertheless, OSHA has it's opinion and it's sticking the script, no matter how ridiculous it sounds:

“A strong, fair and effective enforcement program is a key part of OSHA’s overall approach to workplace safety and health,” said Elizabeth Todd, a spokeswoman for OSHA’s Region 6 office. “We have the resources we need to be effective. Our balanced approach to workplace safety and health is succeeding, and it’s validated by workplace injury, illness and fatality rates that are at their lowest levels, even as the work force continues to expand.”

Blah, blah, blah. Not everyone is fooled though.

That response drew a chuckle from Glenn Erwin, who heads the United Steelworkers workplace safety initiatives.

Erwin, a former Texas City resident and BP — then Amoco — employee, is also a member of the panel led by James Baker that is reviewing the safety culture of BP.

“There is never an incident that happens that doesn’t have precursors or warnings before it happens if industry and (regulators) would investigate,” said Erwin, a critic of programs that emphasize investigations only when injuries are involved.

“Companies should be required — and OSHA actively force them — to investigate every incident, no matter what the size and even if no one gets hurt or loses work time.”

Erwin said such measures wouldn’t likely take hold unless Congress gets involved.

Fewer people were killed in the Sago Mine accident “and it sent shock waves all the way through Congress,” said Erwin.

“They even had hearings on mine safety. BP didn’t have that shockwave. There were no hearings until you had that problem with Prudhoe Bay, (Alaska).

“Why was it there were not hearings on Capitol Hill as to why (the Texas City) incident was allowed to happen? It’s a double standard.”

Erwin credits the Chemical Safety Board with putting pressure on BP as well as on federal regulators.

“Had it not been for the CSB calling attention to this last year, Terry Shiavo would have been the only news, and we would have been a footnote,” he said. “Congress was so worried about that one woman’s life, but didn’t get at all bothered that 15 people were killed.”

Amen brother.

Labels: BP, Chemical Safety Board, Coal Mining, OSHA

Charleston Gazette staff writer Ken Ward Jr. will be on NPR's All Things Considered this evening talking about recent mine safety issues, including his recent study (described here),about his investigation into mine safety that showed that 90 percent of mine deaths could have been avoided if safety regulations had been followed.

Tune in. If you miss it, you can go here later this evening and listen at your computer.

UPDATE: I liked this part the best:

Reporter Melissa Block: Would folks in the coal mining industry say, 'Look, this is inherently dangerous work, not everything is preventable and accidents happen that we could have never predicted.

Ward: They certainly do say that. In the case of Sago, that's certainly the story the the International Coal Group has tried to spread. The theory at Sago is that lightning caused that explosion and that's what killed those miners. But as a matter of fact, that mine had a number of electrical violations that had never been fixed that could have played a role in that lightning causing the explosion.

***

As a matter of fact, in 88%, almost nine out of ten of the deaths that I looked at, there were violations that caused the death, and had those violations not occurred, the deaths wouldn't have occurred. So saying "accidents will happen" is a nice sounding cliche, but until these violations are eliminated, I'm not sure that's really much solace to the miners that are dying.

Labels: Coal Mining, Sago

Charleston Gazette reporter Ken Ward is one of the best labor writers in the country. But Ward isn’t your usual labor writer; instead of spending time writing about union campaigns and labor laws, he writes about workers, more specifically coal miners and what’s killing them.

Ward’s special report in Sunday’s Gazette documents the situation in America’s coal mines – conditions that exist in many of this country’s other workplaces as well. Ward’s observations are fairly obvious to those of us who following workplace safety: Most miners die alone, in ones or twos, unreported by most newspaper, and unnoticed by most Americans. But more important is Ward’s second point: that almost all of these deaths were the result of employers ignoring safety rules..

Ward’s study begins with the story of Kentucky coal miner Bud Morris whose leg was severed in a mine accident and how he bled to death, unnoticed by the nation’s media – unlike the 12 Sago miners who died with the world watch. Ward’s point:

Bud Morris died alone, like most other coal miners killed on the job in America….Mine disasters like Sago get headlines. But far more coal miners die as Bud Morris did — alone, crushed by heavy equipment, ground up by runaway machinery, buried beneath collapsed mine roofs.

***

Only 13 percent of the more than 100,000 coal miners killed in the United States in the last 100 years have died in mine disasters, which regulators define as accidents causing five or more deaths.

These are the same points that I’ve often made, originally using the example of the Challenger astronauts.

But the more important point the Ward’s study makes is this:

Most of these coal miners also died for the same reason: Their employers ignored safety rules.

Almost every single one of the 320 workers killed in U.S. coal mines in the last decade didn’t have to die, according to a six-month investigation of coal mine safety in America.

Nearly nine of every 10 fatal coal-mining accidents in the last decade could have been avoided if existing regulations had been followed, according to a Sunday Gazette-Mail study of MSHA reports.

The main causes that Ward lists are mine companies’ failure to perform required safety check, properly maintain equipment, violations of roof control, mine ventilation or other required safety plans, and inadequate training.

Personally, I think the situation has changed a bit. Sago was followed closely by the Aracoma fire that killed two miners, and then the Darby explosion that killed 5. Every time another miner dies in the United States, articles appear that include the current count for the year, as well as a short paragraph recounting the company’s recent history of MSHA citations, injuries and fatalities. But unnoticed by most Americans is this fact that Ward points out:

At Sago, Aracoma and Darby, a total of 19 coal miners died. Through Oct. 31, another 24 [26 as of November 7] coal miners have died alone — more than the total death toll in 2005.

Some observers think this is more than just a bunch of coincidences:

With coal prices high, pressure is on mine managers and miners to get coal out as fast — and as cheaply — as possible. Miners and mine safety advocates worry that more miners will perish in the process.

“Safety is taking a back seat to production right now,” said Floyd Campbell, a United Mine Workers safety committee member at Foundation Coal’s Emerald Mine near Waynesburg, Pa.

James Blankenship, an Alabama coal miner and UMW representative, said, “As long as the price of coal is where it is, it’s all about production — get it out as fast as you can.

Read the entire article. It’s filled with detailed, chilling stories of mine companies making the same deadly mistakes over and over again, MSHA’s failure to assess meaningful fines, and West Virginia Governor Joe Manchin’s failure to move forward with mine safety initiatives after a lot of ambitious promises made following Sago and Aracoma.

This is only the first of several special reports that Ward is working on. Others will cover the unique dangers faced by strip-mine workers, the controversial emergency breathing devices carried by all coal miners, and the oversight record of the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration.

Labels: Coal Mining, Sago

Coal miner deaths in this country have now reached 45. Four coal miners -- one third of those killed at Sago -- have died on the job over the past three week.

Saturday’s death in Kentucky occurred at the McCoy Elkhorn Coal Corp.’s Mine 23 near Ashcamp in Pike County. Tony Swiney, a 44-year-old section foreman at the underground mines, was killed when he was hit by a large electrical cable plug, according to a preliminary MSHA report.

***

Sunday’s death occurred at Peabody Energy subsidiary Peabody Western Coal’s Kayenta Mine in northeastern Arizona, according to MSHA records.

Few details were available. The accident was listed as an electrocution, said MSHA spokesman Dirk Fillpot.

This marks the fourth coal mine death in the past three weeks. A Kentucky miner was killed October 30. A Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania coal miner, Dale Reightler was killed on October 23 in Pennsylvania. And a 49-year-old West Virginia miner was killed on October 20.

More stories on 2006 mine disasters here.

Labels: Coal Mining, Sago

Great NY Times editorial about Bush's recess appointment of Richard Stickler to head the Mine Safety and Health Administration despite strong opposition from mineworkers and the Senate. The Times also reminds us that Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist had promised a vote on Stickler if Bush recess appointed him, a promise he has not held to.

Only one gripe. Actually, 65 mineworkers have been killed on the job this year, 42 of whom were coal miners. The others were "metal-non-metal" miners, who died in gold, silver, copper and gravel underground or surface mines.

Weakening the Fight for Mine Safety

Despite being twice rebuffed by the Senate, President Bush has named Richard Stickler, a stolid mining industry careerist, to run the mine safety agency whose serial ineptitude has been laid bare this year by the deaths of 42 mineworkers. Waiting until the Senate left town for the elections, Mr. Bush resorted to a recess appointment to place Mr. Stickler at the heart of enforcing new safety reforms that, in earlier hearings, the appointee himself had claimed were not at all that necessary.

To the contrary, these reforms became a crying need brought home to the nation from the depths of the Sago mine disaster in West Virginia, where 12 workers died in January. Sago presented a clinic in failed government oversight. The new law would double a miner’s emergency oxygen to two hours; mandate electronic devices to track trapped miners; and repair the damage originally done by the administration in cutting more than 200 mine safety inspectors in the name of budget economy.

Mr. Stickler points to his six years as Pennsylvania mine safety chief to rebut criticism that he is the latest example in the administration’s dangerous history of packing safety agencies with pro- industry regulators. But the bulk of his career was in corporate management of mines. Miners and lawmakers have cited the federal agency’s own data in warning that injury rates at his mines were higher than the national average. The administration’s pro-industry tack is a running scandal exemplified by Steven Griles, a mining lobbyist who was appointed deputy secretary of the interior. Mr. Griles devoted four years to rolling back mine regulations and then returned to lobbying for an industry long known for its patronage clout with politicians.

Senate opposition to Mr. Stickler reached the point that the nomination was twice withheld. The Republican majority leader, Bill Frist, said that if the president resorted to a recess appointment — a device guaranteeing Mr. Stickler at least a year in office — the Senate would schedule a showdown vote in response. Senator Frist must be held to his promise. Lawmakers should demand a bulldog enforcement director rather than another industry lapdog.

More 2006 Mine Disaster Stories here.

Labels: Coal Mining, Richard Stickler, Sago

Yet another in a long line of unqualified industry foxes has been appointed to guard this country's henhouses. And miners will pay the price.

In deliberate defiance of Congress and the families of mineworkers killed on the job this year, President Bush has appointed Richard Stickler to head the Mine Safety and Health Administration. Because the Senate refused to confirm him, Bush made a recess appointment which he is allowed to do without Senate approval when Congress is out of session.

Stickler was nominated to the post in September 2005, before the Sago disaster and other mine incidents that have raised this year's number of deaths to levels not seen in years, but his nomination was blocked in the Senate and sent back to the White House twice. Forty coal miners have been killed on the job so far this year, compared with 22 in all of last year.

There is nothing in Stickler's work history or public statements that show him to be the man best qualified for this job. Stickler made an completely unimpressive impression at his confirmation hearing. His appearance was less than dynamic, to put it mildly. Some observers quipped that they were tempted to check his pulse to see if he was alive. But it wasn't just his style that was lacking. As Charleston Gazette editors wrote in an editorial opposing Stickler's confirmation:

Despite widespread belief that more communication equipm